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THE SUPREME COURT’S CONTEMPORARY SILVER PLATTER DOCTRINE
ABSTRACT
In a line of cases beginning with United States v. Calandra, the Court has
created a series of exceptions to the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule that
permit illegally seized evidence to be admitted in litigation forums collateral to
criminal trials. This “collateral use” exception allows the government to profit
from Fourth Amendment violations in grand jury investigations, civil tax suits,
habeas proceedings, immigration removal procedures, and parole revocation
hearings. In this essay we argue that these collateral use exceptions raise serious
conceptual and practical concerns. The core of our critique is that the collateral
use exception reconstitutes a version of the “silver platter doctrine.” In the days
before the Fourth Amendment and the exclusionary rule were incorporated to the
states, the silver platter doctrine allowed federal courts to admit evidence seized by
state law enforcement agents during “unreasonable” searches and seizures. The
silver platter doctrine was rejected by the Court in 1960 out of concern that it was
compromising states’ efforts to guarantee constitutional protections because it
created incentives for state law enforcement officers to violate the Fourth
Amendment. By recreating the silver platter doctrine, the Court’s collateral use
cases have recreated some of those incentives. Our research indicates that these
incentives have been successful in altering police practices in ways that threaten the
Fourth Amendment rights of all citizens.
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INTRODUCTION
At its inception in 1886,1 and through its incorporation to the states in 1961,2 the Supreme
Court regarded the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule as a remedy required by constitutional
principle.3 It was designed to nullify violations,4 to prevent the government from benefitting by its
wrongdoing,5 and to preserve the moral integrity of the courts and the government as constitutional
torchbearers.6 On this view, the exclusionary rule was bound to the Fourth Amendment itself. The
remedy defined the right;7 or, as Justice Holmes put the point in Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United
States, “[t]he essence of a provision forbidding the acquisition of evidence in a certain way is that . . .
it shall not be used at all.”8 The alternative, he wrote, “reduces the Fourth Amendment to a form of
words.”9
The contemporary Court has abandoned all of the principled justifications of the Fourth
Amendment exclusionary rule and the conceptual link between that remedy and Fourth Amendment
1

Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886).

2

Mapp vs. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).

3

See, e.g., Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20, 35 (1925) (“The admission of evidence obtained by [an illegal] search and
seizure was error and prejudicial to the substantial rights of [the defendant].”); Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United
States, 251 U.S. 385, 392 (1920) (holding that allowing the government to profit from illegally seized evidence
“reduces the Fourth Amendment to a form of words”); Weeks vs. United States, 232 U.S. 232 U.S. 383, 393 (1914)
(“If letters and private documents can thus be seized and held and used in evidence against a citizen accused of an
offense, the protection of the Fourth Amendment, declaring his right to be secure against such searches and seizures,
is of no value, and so far as those thus placed are concerned, might as well be stricken from the Constitution.”). See
also Robert M. Bloom & David H. Fentin, “A More Majestic Conception”: The Importance of Judicial Integrity in Preserving the
Exclusionary Rule, 13 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 47 (2010); William C. Heffernan, The Fourth Amendment Exclusionary Rule as a
Constitutional Remedy, 88 GEO. L.J. 799, 808 (2000); Potter Stewart, The Road to Mapp v. Ohio and Beyond: The Origins,
Development and Future of the Exclusionary Rule in Search-and-Seizure Cases, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1365, 1372–77 (1983).

4

Weeks, 232 U.S. at 393

5

Id.

6

Id. at 394.

7

Cf. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 147 (1803) (“[E]very right, when withheld, must have a remedy . . . .”).

8

251 U.S. 385, 392 (1920).

9

Id. See also Weeks, 232 U.S. at 393 (“If letters and private documents can thus be seized and held and used in evidence
against a citizen accused of an offense, the protection of the Fourth Amendment, declaring his right to be secure
against such searches and seizures, is of no value, and so far as those thus placed are concerned, might as well be
stricken from the Constitution.”).

Gray, Cooper, & McAloon

Contemporary Silver Platter Doctrine

rights. It has instead adopted what William Heffernan calls the “severance principle,” which holds
that the exclusionary rule is a punitive sanction, not a personal remedy, and that it is justified solely
by its ability to deter government agents from violating the Fourth Amendment and not by its
potential to vindicate harms suffered by citizens whose rights are violated.10 The severance principle
was on prominent display last term in Davis v. United States.11 In that case the Court held that Davis’s
Fourth Amendment rights were violated when his car was searched secondary to his lawful arrest
and the officers could claim neither emergency nor independent probable cause to believe that
evidence of a crime would be found in the car.12 The Court nevertheless held that Davis could not
avail himself of the exclusionary rule because the officers who effected that search relied to their
detriment on federal law established in their circuit, which, following New York v. Belton,13 permitted
police to perform automobile searches as a matter of right incident to a lawful arrest of the driver.
That rule was revoked by the Court in Arizona v. Gant,14 but only after the search of Davis’s car.
Given this course of events, the Court reasoned that inflicting the exclusionary rule would serve no
purpose because it could not have deterred the officers who searched Davis’s car or any similarly
situated officer who abides the established federal law of her circuit.15
As one of us argues at length elsewhere, the Court’s logic in Davis, and other cases where it
has developed and applied this “good faith” exception, is deeply flawed and threatens to degrade
substantive Fourth Amendment rights.16 Jennifer Laurin has reached a similar conclusion on
different grounds by critically engaging the Court’s decisions limiting the access of citizens to civil
10

Heffernan, supra note 3, at 825.

11

131 S. Ct. 2419 (2011). For an argument that Davis should have been decided differently see Orin S. Kerr, Good Faith,
New Law, and the Scope of the Exclusionary Rule, 99 Geo. L.J. 1077, 1084–85 (2011).

12

Davis, 131 S. Ct. at 2431.

13

453 U.S. 454 (1981).

14

556 U.S. 332 (2009).

15

Davis, 131 S. Ct. at 2428–29.

16

See David Gray, A Spectacular Non Sequitur (February 27, 2012) (unpublished manuscript on file with authors).
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remedies under 18 U.S.C. §1983.17 In this essay we advance this critique by engaging in a close
analysis of another far-reaching exception to the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule that has
grown out of the severance principle: the collateral use exception.
In a line of cases beginning with United States v. Calandra,18 the Court has created a series of
exceptions to the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule that allow illegally seized evidence to be
admitted in litigation forums collateral to criminal trials. This “collateral use” exception permits the
government to profit from Fourth Amendment violations in grand jury investigations,19 civil tax
suits,20 habeas proceedings,21 immigration removal procedures,22 and parole revocation hearings.23 In
this essay we argue that the collateral use exception raises serious conceptual and practical concerns.
The core of our critique is the fact that the collateral use exception reconstitutes a version of what
was once known as the “silver platter doctrine,” which allowed evidence seized illegally by state and
local police to be admitted in federal court as long as the local officials were not acting as agents of
federal law enforcement. The silver platter doctrine was rejected by the Court in Elkins vs. United
States24 out of concern that it was compromising states’ efforts to guarantee constitutional
protections for their citizens by creating incentives for state and local police officers to violate the
Fourth Amendment.25 By recreating the silver platter doctrine, the Court’s collateral use cases have
reconstituted these incentives, encouraging law enforcement officers at all levels to engage in illegal
searches and seizures. These are not abstract concerns. Our research indicates that these incentives
17

See Jennifer E. Laurin, Trawling for Herring: Lessons in Doctrinal Borrowing and Convergence, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 670 (2011).

18

414 U.S. 338 (1974).

19

Id.

20

United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433 (1976).

21

Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976).

22

I.N.S. v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032 (1984).

23

Penn. Bd. of Probation and Parole v. Scott, 524 U.S. 357 (1998).

24

364 U.S. 206 (1960).

25

Id. at 222.
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are altering police practices in ways that threaten the Fourth Amendment rights of all citizens, and
particularly those whose economic circumstances or ethnic identities make them all too frequent
targets for abuse.26 We begin with a brief history of the silver platter doctrine.
THE BIRTH OF THE SILVER PLATTER DOCTRINE
Weeks v. United States, decided in 1914, established the exclusionary rule as the primary
mechanism to enforce Fourth Amendment rights against federal officers in federal court
proceedings.27 There the Court committed to the exclusionary rule as a matter of constitutional
principle.28 Specifically, the Court held that the constitutional imperative that government officials
not engage in “unreasonable” searches and seizures would be violated and the Fourth Amendment
effectively nullified if those who are “intrusted under our Federal system with the enforcement of
the laws” could be “aided by the sacrifice of those great principles established by years of endeavor
and suffering which have resulted in their embodiment in the fundamental law of the land.”29 In
addition to its concerns with fundamental principle, the Court in Weeks also worried about the
integrity of the federal judiciary and the government more generally, which would be compromised
if federal prosecutors were allowed to exploit at trial Fourth Amendment violations perpetrated by
their investigative colleagues.30
Although the Court in Weeks held that exclusion was the only remedy for Fourth
Amendment violations sufficient to maintain the integrity of the Constitution and the courts, it did
26

For example, according to the 2010 Census, fourteen percent of the population identified themselves as “black” and
seventy-five percent identified as “white.” However, a disproportionate thirty-nine percent of the parole population
in 2010 was black while only forty-two percent were white. Almost by definition, then, the collateral use exception for
parole revocation hearings will impact black citizens disproportionately. As we point out below, these raw numbers
only begin to tell the full story.

27

232 U.S. 383 (1914).

28

Id. at 392.

29

Id. at 392.

30

Id. at 394.
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not impose either the Fourth Amendment or the exclusionary rule on state courts. The Fourth
Amendment was not incorporated to the states until Wolf v. Ohio in 1949,31 and the exclusionary rule
was not incorporated until Mapp vs. Ohio32 in 1961. The intervening years gave rise to a practice
known as the “silver platter doctrine,” which allowed federal courts to admit evidence seized in
violation of the Fourth Amendment by state law enforcement agents if those state officials neither
acted at the direction nor with the foreknowledge of federal agents.33 Byars v. United States34 shows
the doctrine’s basic operation.
Byars involved an investigation by state law enforcement into the manufacture of intoxicating
liquors. Despite their failure to show that there was probable cause to believe that the fruits and
instrumentalities35 of a crime would be found on the premises, local law enforcement officers
secured a warrant from a local magistrate granting them authority to search Byars’s home for
“intoxicating liquors and instruments and materials used in the manufacture of such liquors.”36 On
their way to conduct the search, the local officers recruited a federal revenue agent named Adams to
assist them. Adams participated in the search, which resulted in the discovery of “strip stamps”
used to prove the provenance and tax status of whiskey. Adams took custody of the stamps, which
were later introduced at trial when Byars was prosecuted for violating federal liquor laws. There was
no dispute that the stamps were the product of an illegal search. Nevertheless, the Court pointed
out that the United States Attorney was at liberty under the silver platter doctrine “to avail [himself]
of evidence improperly seized by state officers operating entirely upon their own account.”
31

338 U.S. 25 (1949).

32

367 U.S. 643 (1961).

33

Elkins, 364 U.S. at 213-15.

34

273 U.S. 23 (1927).

35

Before 1967, the Court took the position that warrants should not issue if the proposed search was for “mere
evidence” rather than the “fruits and instrumentalities” of a crime. The Court abandoned that view in Warden v.
Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 301 (1967).

36

Id. at 33.
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Unfortunately for the government, the state agents did not act entirely on their own account when
conducting the search of Byars’s home. Rather, the Court found, Adams was a principal in the
“wrongful search and seizure,” which barred application of the silver platter doctrine.37 Therefore,
while affirming the silver platter doctrine itself, the Court held that the facts in Byars fell outside its
scope because the illegal search was conducted in part by a federal official.
The Court’s recognition of the silver platter doctrine during the first half of the Twentieth
Century is easy to understand. After all, the Fourth Amendment had not been incorporated to the
states and, therefore, it was literally impossible for a state agent to violate the Fourth Amendment,
no matter how unreasonable his conduct. Absent a violation, the principled concerns that animated
the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule in Weeks and Silverthorne simply did not arise. What is
surprising is that nothing much changed in 1949 when the Court incorporated the Fourth
Amendment to the states in Wolf v. Ohio.38 Despite limiting state agents to the compass of the
Fourth Amendment in Wolf, the Court declined to incorporate the exclusionary rule.39 The Court
instead left it to each of the various states to develop its own enforcement regime. Over the next
decade or so about half of the states adopted the exclusionary rule.40 Those decisions had no
bearing on what happened in federal court, however. As a consequence, in states where the
exclusionary rule was adopted as a matter of state law, officers who faced exclusion in state court
could simply hand illegally seized evidence off to their federal colleagues, who could use it at will in
federal court.

37

Id.

38

338 U.S. 25 (1949).

39

Wolf, 338 U.S at 27, 33. See also United States v. Wallace & Tiernan Co., 336 U.S. 793, 798 (1949) (indicating in dicta
that the exclusionary rule is an “extraordinary sanction devised by this Court to prevent violations of the Fourth
Amendment.”).

40

Elkins, 364 U.S. 206 at 218-20.
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THE DEMISE OF THE SILVER PLATTER DOCTRINE
The silver platter doctrine survived for more than a decade after Wolf until Elkins v. United
States.41 Writing for the Court in Elkins, Justice Stewart first pointed out that, in the wake of Wolf,
the silver platter doctrine constituted a bit of a contradiction in that it suggested that there was a
substantive difference between the Fourth Amendment as enforced directly on federal agents and as
enforced indirectly through the Fourteenth Amendment due process clause.42 In addition to this
problem of “logical symmetry,”43 Justice Stewart also took account of the damage that the silver
platter doctrine was doing to efforts by state courts to secure the protections of the Fourth
Amendment for their citizens against state law enforcement officers. The Court in Elkins was
particularly persuaded by the experience of states, like California, that had first rejected and then
accepted the exclusionary rule in the years after Wolf.44
Like many of its sister states, California took advantage of the discretion afforded to it after
Wolf to experiment with different ways to secure Fourth Amendment protections for its citizens.
The Supreme Court of California, led by the legendary jurist Roger J. Traynor, was initially quite
skeptical of the exclusionary rule and declined to follow the Supreme Court’s example, even after
Wolf.45 That court instead left enforcement of the Fourth Amendment to administrative, criminal,
and civil remedies.46 The views of Judge Traynor and his brethren changed dramatically in
subsequent years as they assessed the results of their experiment. By 1955 it was clear to them that
local and state agents in California were routinely violating the Fourth Amendment and that
41

364 U.S. 206 (1960).

42

Id. at 215.

43

Id. at 216.

44

Id. at 221-22.

45

Judge Traynor later recounted his personal conversion from exclusionary rule critic to supporter in a thoughtful essay.
See Roger J. Traynor, Mapp v. Ohio at Large in the Fifty States, 1962 DUKE L.J. 319, 321-22 (1962).

46

People v. Cahan, 44 Cal. 2d. 434, 447 (1955)
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“experience ha[d] demonstrated” that “neither administrative, criminal, nor civil remedies [we]re
effective in suppressing lawless searches and seizures.”47 Writing for his court in People v. Cahan,
Judge Traynor therefore reversed course and held that, henceforth, evidence seized in violation of
the Fourth Amendment would not be admissible in trials conducted in California courts, no matter
who paid the salaries of the offending officers.48
The effect of the exclusionary rule on California law enforcement agents was immediate and
dramatic. Less than two years after Cahan, California’s highest-ranking law enforcement officer
reported that adopting the exclusionary rule had improved dramatically the professionalism of state
law enforcement officers and had brought about a much closer working relationship between police
officers and prosecutors.49 In the face of these successes, the Elkins Court expressed concern that
the silver platter doctrine not only interposed a logical contradiction in substantive Fourth
Amendment law, but also “frustrate[d] state policy [designed to secure Fourth Amendment rights] . .
. in a particularly inappropriate and ironic way” by providing a collateral forum for the admission of
evidence seized illegally by state agents.50 The Court’s straightforward concern was that existence of
the silver platter doctrine preserved significant incentives for state law enforcement agents to violate
the Fourth Amendment. These officers knew, after all, that even if the evidence could not be used
at a state trial, it could still be used to prosecute federal crimes. In addition to these practical
concerns, the Court also held that preserving the silver platter doctrine in the face of increasing
acceptance of the exclusionary rule by state courts compromised the integrity of the state

47

Id.

48

Id.

49

Elkins, 364 U.S. at 221-22.

50

Id. at 222 (“Yet when a federal court sitting in an exclusionary state admits evidence lawlessly seized by state agents, it
not only frustrates state policy, but frustrates that policy in a particularly inappropriate and ironic way. For by
admitting the unlawfully seized evidence the federal court serves to defeat the state’s effort to assure obedience to the
Federal Constitution.”).
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governments, the federal government, and the federal courts when federal courts endorsed by
implication the unlawful conduct of state agents.51
The Court confirmed the views expressed in Elkins a year later in Mapp v. Ohio, which
incorporated the exclusionary rule to the states.52 Mapp was based on the proposition that “the rule
excluding in federal criminal trials evidence which is the product of an illegal search and seizure is
‘part and parcel’ of the Fourth Amendment.”53 In making its case, the Court reprised the
experiences of various states and concluded that remedies other than exclusion had proved to be
“worthless and futile” as means to punish and deter law enforcement misconduct.54 The Court also
confirmed that the exclusionary rule is “an essential part of the right to privacy” embodied in the
Fourth Amendment and that failing to require exclusion when state agents violate the Fourth
Amendment would be “to grant the right but in reality to withhold its privilege and enjoyment.”55
Emphasizing that rules matter, the Mapp Court held categorically that “no man is to be convicted on
unconstitutional evidence.”56 Finally, following Justice Stewart in Elkins and Justice Holmes in
Silverthorne, the Court pointed out that exclusion is required by both “the imperative of judicial
integrity” and the principle that governments must obey the rules that govern them in order to
maintain their own moral authority.57
Elkins and Mapp leave no doubt about the Court’s view that the silver platter doctrine
offended the Fourth Amendment itself by allowing officers to exploit illegally seized evidence in
collateral proceedings. In addition to these principled concerns the Court also had before it
51

Id. at 222-25.

52

367 U.S. 643 (1961).

53

Id. at 678 (Harlan, J., dissenting).

54

Id. at 651-53, 657-58. See also id. at 669-72 (Douglas, J., concurring).

55

Id. at 656.

56

Id. at 657.

57

Id. at 659 (“Nothing can destroy a government more quickly than its failure to observe its own laws, or worse, its
disregard of the charter of its own existence.”).
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persuasive evidence that the exclusionary rule was a singularly effective tool for securing Fourth
Amendment protections, but that its effectiveness was compromised by opening the door to
admission of illegally seized evidence in collateral forums. This practical concern was particularly
salient, the Court noted, given the close working relationships between state and federal law
enforcement officers,58 which highlighted for each paths by which they could readily circumnavigate
the Fourth Amendment. The only solution, the Court held, was to block those collateral channels.59
Unfortunately, those dams have not held.
THE RISE OF THE CONTEMPORARY SILVER PLATTER DOCTRINE
In a series of cases beginning with United States v. Calandra,60 the Court has declined to
enforce the exclusionary rule when government officials seek to introduce illegally seized evidence
during collateral proceedings including grand jury investigations,61 civil tax suits,62 habeas
proceedings,63 immigration removal procedures,64 and parole revocation hearings.65 By creating
these exceptions to the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule the Court has incrementally
rehabilitated the silver platter doctrine that it condemned in Elkins. In the process the Court has
also recreated the same kinds of systemic incentives to violate the Fourth Amendment that the
Elkins Court found had “frustrate[ed]” “in a particularly ironic way” efforts to curb unreasonable
searches and seizures.

58

Elkins, 364 U.S. at 211.

59

Id. at 222.

60

414 U.S. 358 (1974).

61

Id.

62

United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433 (1976).

63

Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976).

64

I.N.S. v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032 (1984).

65

Penn. Bd. of Probation and Parole v. Scott, 524 U.S. 357 (1998).
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The question for the Court in Calandra was whether evidence seized in violation of the
Fourth Amendment could be admitted directly or by implication in a grand jury investigation.66
Federal agents had conducted a search of Mr. Calandra’s place of business under authority of a
warrant granting leave to search for evidence relating to an alleged gambling operation. The agents
found no such evidence, but did find promissory notes issued in Calandra’s favor. Despite the fact
that these debt instruments were neither within the scope of of the warrant nor obviously criminal in
nature, the agents seized them.
Calandra subsequently sought return of the promissory notes alleging that the warrant was
not supported by probable cause and that, at any rate, the officers exceeded the scope of the warrant
when they seized the promissory notes. That motion was granted. In the meantime the United
States Attorney impaneled a special grand jury to investigate allegations of loan sharking. Calandra
was subpoenaed to testify. Although he planned to invoke his Fifth Amendment privilege against
compelled self-incrimination, Calandra feared that he would be forced to testify under a limited
grant of immunity. He therefore sought to bar the United States Attorney from soliciting during
grand jury proceedings any testimony based on the illegally seized evidence. The district court
agreed and the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed; and in doing
so contradicted the core holding in Elkins.
As Justice Holmes wrote decades before Elkins and Mapp, “[t]he essence of a provision
forbidding the acquisition of evidence in a certain way is that not merely evidence so acquired shall
not be used before the Court but that it shall not be used at all.”67 Elkins and Mapp in turn stand for
the proposition that consistency in enforcement among forums is essential as a matter of both
principle and practicality. To allow any government agent to use illegally seized evidence in some

66

Calandra, 414 U.S. at 338.

67

Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 392 (1920).
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proceedings while excluding it in others cuts the Fourth Amendment at root and leaf by
compromising both the integrity of the right and the capacity of the exclusionary rule to deter by
“removing the incentive to disregard [the Fourth Amendment].”68
Calandra and subsequent collateral use cases recreate what Elkins forbade. Specifically, by
allowing illegally seized evidence to be admitted in collateral proceedings, the Court has created
powerful incentives for law enforcement officers and other government agents to violate the Fourth
Amendment. It has done so without even acknowledging its departure from Elkins. Worse still, the
Court has repeatedly relied upon Elkins for the proposition that the primary purpose of the
exclusionary rule is to deter law enforcement officers by removing incentives to violate the Fourth
Amendment without acknowledging or addressing the fact that these considerations were precisely
those which led the Court to reject the original silver platter doctrine in the first place.69 That
omission is particularly galling because the collateral use exceptions have constructed a series of
contemporary silver platter doctrines in various forums that individually and collectively provide
significant incentives for government agents to ignore fundamental Fourth Amendment rights.
It might be objected at this point that we are being wholly unfair to the Court by suggesting
that its holdings in Calandra and subsequent collateral use cases create contemporary silver platter
doctrines and therefore contradict the Court’s holding in Elkins.70 Then-Professor Easterbrook gave
voice to the concern three decades ago in Ways of Criticizing the Court.71 There, Easterbrook argued
that the fundamental dynamics of the Court’s institutional structure make inconsistent decisions
inevitable.72 His case was built upon insights from public choice theory, and in particular on

68

Elkins, 364 U.S. at 217.

69

See, e.g., Calandra, 414 U.S. at 347-48; Janis, 428 U.S. at 445.

70

We are in debt to Orin Kerr for pressing this concern.

71

Frank Easterbrook, Ways of Criticizing the Court, 95 HARV. L. REV. 802 (1982).

72

Id. at 811-32.
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Kenneth Arrow’s groundbreaking Impossibility Theorem, for which Arrow won the Nobel
Memorial Prize in Economics.73 Easterbrook’s conclusions, and the application of public choice
theory to the Court, have since been topics of hot debate among public choice theorists.74 Although
fascinating, those contests are beyond the scope of this essay. For present purposes we will accept
Easterbrook’s conclusion arguendo because it provides an opportunity to clarify and deepen our
objection to the Court’s creation of contemporary silver platter doctrines. We take up this task in
the next section.
THE CONTEMPORARY SILVER PLATTER DOCTRINE’S SPECTACULAR NON-SEQUITUR
Although Easterbrook argues that it is unfair and unproductive to accuse the Court of
inconsistency among decisions, he maintains that it is completely within bounds to object if the
Court’s logic within a given case is incoherent or if its reasons are insufficient to justify its
conclusions.75 Although we are uncomfortable with the contradiction between Elkins and the cases
that create contemporary silver platter doctrines, that discomfort is derivative. Our core concerns,
which we explore in this section and those that follow, are that the Court’s reasons in Calandra and
other collateral use cases are insufficient to support its conclusions and that, as a consequence, the
Court has created pathological incentives for law enforcement officers to violate the Fourth
Amendment. Our argument gets traction by taking seriously the Court’s insistence that the sole
justification of the exclusionary rule is its capacity to deter law enforcement officers.76
73

For a concise and available explanation of the Arrow Theorem see MAXWELL L. STEARNS & TODD J. ZYWICKI,
PUBLIC CHOICE CONCEPTS AND APPLICATIONS, 107-09, 138-51 (2009).

74

See, e.g., MAXWELL L. STEARNS, CONSTITUTIONAL PROCESS: A SOCIAL CHOICE ANALYSIS OF SUPREME COURT
DECISION-MAKING (2000); Richard H. Pildes & Elizabeth S. Anderson, Slinging Arrows at Democracy; Social Choice
Theory, Value Pluralism, and Democratic Politics, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 2121 (1990); David Post & Steven C. Salop, Rowing
Against the Tidewater: A Theory of Voting by Multijudge Panels, 80 GEO. L.J. 743 (1992); John M. Rogers, “I Vote this Way
Because I’m Wrong”: The Supreme Court Justice as Epimenides, 79 KY. L.J. 439 (1991).

75

Easterbrook, supra note 71, at 830.

76

This is a relatively recent commitment and represents a shift from the Court’s focus on constitutional principle and
institutional integrity in Weeks and Mapp. For a brief history of this shift see Gray¸ supra note 16.
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Writing for the Court in Calandra, Justice Powell cites Elkins for the foundational premise
that the “[exclusionary] rule’s prime purpose is to deter future unlawful police conduct and thereby
to effectuate the guarantee of the Fourth Amendment.”77 Given the threat of exclusion at a criminal
trial, Justice Powell asserts that “extension” of the rule to grand jury proceedings “would deter only
police investigation consciously directed toward the discovery of evidence solely for use in the grand
jury investigation.”78 The Court’s logic here indulges what H.L.A. Hart described in different
circumstances as a “spectacular non sequitur”79 and as a consequence claims too much.
Hart leveled his charge against Jeremy Bentham’s attempts to reconstruct common law
culpability excuses based solely on utilitarian grounds.80 The common law’s interest in culpability,
and its complementary willingness to excuse based on infancy, insanity, and mistakes of fact, is a
consequence of the dominant role played by moral considerations and retributivist theories of
punishment in its development.81 Bentham rejected retributivism but nevertheless wanted to
preserve these excuses. He therefore attempted to reconstruct them on deterrence grounds.82 His
argument is built on a straightforward insight: by virtue of their infancy, insanity, or mistake,
inculpable offenders are not aware that they are breaking the law and therefore do not fear
punishment. Because the threat of punishment plays no role in their decision making, Bentham
77

Calandra, 414 U.S. at 347-48 (citing Elkins, 364 U.S. at 217). As is pointed out below, this selective citation to Elkins
ignores that decision’s further reliance on constitutional principles, including the “imperative” of preserving judicial
and governmental integrity. Elkins, 364 U.S. at 222.
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argues that it would be “inefficacious” to punish them.83 Because punishing offenders who are
undeterrable serves no crime-control purpose, Bentham concludes that there is no justification for
inflicting punishment in cases where culpability is absent.
Hart’s charge of non sequitur is meant to show that Bentham’s efforts fall well short of
justifying general culpability excuses. Rather, Hart writes,
. . . all that [Bentham] proves is the quite different proposition that the threat of
punishment will be ineffective so far as the class of persons who suffer from these
conditions is concerned. Plainly it is possible that though (as Bentham says) the
threat of punishment could not have operated on them, the actual infliction of
punishment on those persons may secure a higher measure of conformity to the
law on the part of normal persons than is secured by the admission of excusing
conditions.84

It is a straightforward but powerful point along at least two dimensions. The first is temporal.
Although it is absolutely true that punishing an inculpable offender will not have deterred him from
his past offense, it does not follow that inflicting punishment now will not deter him from future
offenses, particularly if his past offense was a function of ignorance or mistake that can be avoided
in the future. The second dimension draws on the distinction between specific and general
deterrence. Punishing an inculpable offender may not serve to deter him, but that does not mean
that utility would not be served because punishing him will have a deterrent effect on other potential
offenders.85 Furthermore, as Hart points out, a punitive regime uncomplicated by excuses may
provide greater deterrence precisely because potential offenders cannot entertain the possibility of
escaping punishment by malingering.86
The Court’s logic in Calandra follows Bentham’s reconstruction of common law defenses
and is therefore equally vulnerable to Hart’s critique. Recall that the Court starts with the
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HART, supra note 79, at 19.
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proposition that the only reason to inflict the exclusionary rule in any given case is its potential to
deter the offending officer and other similarly situated officers from perpetrating Fourth
Amendment violations in the future. Because, by hypothesis, officers who engage in searches are
primarily interested in securing evidence that will be admissible at trial, the Court concludes that
enforcing the exclusionary rule in grand jury proceedings “would deter only police investigation
consciously directed toward the discovery of evidence solely for use in the grand jury investigation.”
As Hart’s critique of Bentham suggests, this conclusion does not follow. First, it is not necessary
that an officer be interested “solely” in grand jury proceedings. He may well be deterred if grand
jury proceedings are among a series of law enforcement goals. Second, and following Hart, although
it might be true in any given case that the threat of exclusion in the grand jury context may not deter
an officer who is neither aware of nor interested in grand jury proceedings, exclusion in the grand
jury context surely would add to the general deterrent threat against all officers.87
This is a narrow point to be sure. It is nevertheless revelatory. Recall that our initial concern
with Calandra was that it creates a contemporary silver platter doctrine. Our objection is not simply
that doing so contradicts the Court’s holding in Elkins. Rather, our concern is that the Court’s field
of vision in Calandra and its progeny is artificially constrained by the spectacular non sequitur,
blinding it both to the deterrence potential of the exclusionary rule in these cases and to the positive
incentives it is creating for police to violate the Fourth Amendment. In the remainder of this essay
we argue that the Court has routinely indulged the spectacular non sequitur when justifying the
collateral use doctrine. As a result, the Court has routinely misidentified the constituents of its
deterrence calculation. As a consequence of this miscalculation, the Court has created a series of
powerful incentives for a whole range of government agents to violate Fourth Amendment rights.
87

This is essentially the same point endorsed by the Court in its investigative use cases, where it has barred officers from
exploiting illegally seized evidence to advance their investigations, without regard to whether their intentions when
violating the Fourth Amendment was to seize evidence for later admission at trial. See, e.g., Wong Sun v. United
States, 371 U.S. 471, 484-91 (1963).

[19]

91 TEXAS L. REV.

(2012)

The Court’s primary concern in Elkins was to eliminate these incentives out of respect for general
deterrence goals lest the Court promote Fourth Amendment violations. Although we would prefer
to see consistency in the Court’s jurisprudence, our core objection here is not that the Court has
serially contradicted the holding in Elkins. Rather, our concern is that the Court has ignored the
wisdom of Elkins. We begin with grand jury proceedings, the collateral forum at stake in Calandra.
THE PATHOLOGICAL CONSEQUENCES OF THE CONTEMPORARY SILVER PLATTER DOCTRINE
PART 1: GRAND JURY PROCEEDINGS
Calandra established an exception to the exclusionary rule for grand jury proceedings and
thereby initiated a series of cases reconstituting the silver platter doctrine. The Court justified
opening a collateral avenue for the use and admission of illegally seized evidence on the ground that
officers are engaged in detecting and securing evidence for criminal trials, and that, therefore,
suppressing evidence in grand jury proceedings would only deter officers who are “solely” interested
in obtaining evidence for a grand jury proceeding.88 This reasoning marks a clear instance of the
spectacular non sequitur. Although it may well be true that the threat of exclusion in grand jury
proceedings does not threaten officers who are not thinking about the grand jury when they violate
the Fourth Amendment, this does not mean that actual enforcement of the exclusionary rule in the
grand jury will not secure a higher measure of conformity with the Fourth Amendment in general,
particularly given the central role of the grand jury in many law enforcement officers’ lives. As we
will argue in this section, taking note of the role of the spectacular non sequitur in the Court’s logic
in Calandra reveals that its deterrence calculations are artificially constrained, naïve, and that its
holding therefore incentivizes Fourth Amendment violations.

88
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Although the grand jury is technically not an adversarial proceeding and does not engage in
determinations of guilt or innocence,89 it has a long history in our criminal justice system as a check
on law enforcement.90 In this role the grand jury’s task in felony cases is to decide whether evidence
arrayed by the government demonstrates probable cause sufficient to justify prosecution.91 The
Fifth Amendment provides a right to a grand jury indictment in the federal courts.92 That right has
not been incorporated to the states,93 but just under half of the states nevertheless require a grand
jury indictment for serious crimes.94 Where it is in use, the grand jury also serves critical law
enforcement functions during investigations.95 Because it has expansive subpoena powers, the grand
jury can make demands on witnesses that police and prosecutors cannot. As a consequence, law
enforcement investigations often are conducted in conjunction with the grand jury. When this is the
case, the grand jury stands not between arrest and indictment, but as the gatekeeper on arrest and is
therefore a primary forum of concern for law enforcement officers.
By creating a silver platter doctrine for grand jury proceedings, Calandra gives officers license
to violate the Fourth Amendment in order to achieve their immediate professional goals. Whether
wearing its investigator or its guardian hat, the grand jury figures prominently in the immediate
interests of law enforcement agents—and often looms much larger than a criminal trial. Police
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officers usually are rated and compensated based on arrests rather than convictions.96 As a
consequence, securing a grand jury indictment is an end in itself from an officer’s point of view.
This is obviously the case where the grand jury is conducting an original investigation and its
decision to return a true bill stands between the officer and a closed case file. It is also true in cases
where the grand jury is acting as a gatekeeper between arrest and indictment. Should the grand jury
decline to indict, the case will remain open, a red mark on the officer’s record waiting to go black.
As a consequence, police officers have an immediate interest in obtaining evidence sufficient to
support an indictment. By contrast, criminal trials frequently do not go forward for months or years
after an arrest; and acquittals seldom result in a closed case’s being reopened unless there is evidence
that the person put on trial was actually innocent. It follows that, from a deterrence point of view,
law enforcement officers care a great deal about the outcome of grand jury proceedings, even if it is
not their “sole” concern.
By creating a blanket silver platter doctrine under which illegally seized evidence can be
admitted during grand jury proceedings, the Calandra Court introduced powerful and immediate
incentives for officers to violate the Fourth Amendment.97 That incentive is even more compelling
given the significant role of plea bargaining in our justice system. The vast majority of criminal
prosecutions are resolved by plea bargain rather than at trial.98 In 2009 alone, over 95% of
judgments entered in federal courts were based on guilty pleas.99 An indictment, or the threat of an
indictment, gives prosecutors incredible bargaining power during plea negotiations. The prospect of
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having this leverage not only provides officers with an immediate incentive to violate the Fourth
Amendment in order to secure evidence that can be presented to the grand jury, it encourages
prosecutors to look the other way and provides them with explicit license to exploit the fruits of
Fourth Amendment violations. The silver platter doctrine created in Calandra therefore goes beyond
encouraging police officers to violate the Fourth Amendment; it also threatens the moral integrity of
prosecutors as agents of justice by creating incentives for them to exploit and therefore endorse
illegal searches and seizures.
The incentive for police officers and prosecutors to violate the Fourth Amendment is
particularly strong in organized crime and conspiracy cases.100 Here the dominant investigative and
prosecutorial strategy is to leverage relatively minor participants with the threat of lengthy sentences
in order to secure their cooperation and testimony.101 These are not cases on the margin. The
investigation and prosecution of drug conspiracies dominate contemporary law enforcement
practice.102 With the grand jury silver platter doctrine in place, beat cops and detectives have daily
incentives to commit routine Fourth Amendment violations as they troll for the small fish needed to
catch the bigger fish.103
This iteration of the contemporary silver platter doctrine has a further consequence, which is
to draw a veil over the actual conduct of law enforcement. In his Calandra dissent, Justice Brennan
expressed his unease with the prospect that the majority’s opinion left the door ajar for law
enforcement officers to violate the Fourth Amendment at will.104 The institutional analysis we have
presented gives considerable weight to his concerns. Perhaps more worrisome is that the inability of
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defendants to litigate Fourth Amendment issues at the grand jury stage and the prominent role of
plea bargaining in our system combine to make it impossible to discover the extent of the epidemic.
That mystery is discomfiting of itself, but also bespeaks a broad abdication of the judiciary’s role as a
Fourth Amendment guardian and check on law enforcement officers engaged in the “competitive
enterprise of ferreting out crime.”105
THE PATHOLOGICAL CONSEQUENCES OF THE CONTEMPORARY SILVER PLATTER DOCTRINE
PART 2: IMMIGRATION PROCEEDINGS
The Court placed immigration removal hearings outside the scope of the exclusionary rule in
INS v. Lopez-Mendoza.106 The Court’s reasoning in that case is built around the same spectacular non
sequitur introduced in Calandra. Specifically, the Court argued that law enforcement officers are
primarily interested in criminal law enforcement, not immigration enforcement, and that imposing
the exclusionary rule in immigration proceedings therefore offers little or no additional deterrence
benefit beyond that provided by the threat of suppression in criminal trials.107 To paraphrase Hart,
although it may well be true that the threat of exclusion in removal proceedings does not threaten
officers who are not thinking about removal proceedings when they violate the Fourth Amendment,
this does not mean that actual enforcement of the exclusionary rule in removal hearings will not
secure a higher measure of conformity with the Fourth Amendment in general. Hart’s point takes
on particular weight here because, in addition to indulging a non sequitur, the Court in LopezMendoza ignored the large cadre of government officials whose primary duty is to pursue removal
and also rested its holding on a naïve view of the deep relationships between law enforcement and
Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948); William J. Mertens & Silas Wasserstrom, The Good Faith Exception to
the Exclusionary Rule: Deregulating the Police and Derailing the Law, 70 GEO. L.J. 365, 396-97 (1981).

105
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the exclusionary rule in “egregious” cases that implicated “fundamental fairness.” See, e.g., United States v. AlmeidaAmaral, 461 F.3d 231 (2nd Cir. 2006); United States v. Gonzalez-Rivera, 22 F.3d 1441 (9th Cir. 1994). Cases in which
that rule has been applied are few and far between, however, and do little to alter the core shift in incentives
accomplished by Lopez-Mendoza.
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immigration enforcement. As the Court pointed out in Padilla v. Kentucky, “deportation is an integral
part—indeed, sometimes the most important part—of the penalty that may be imposed on
noncitizen defendants who plead guilty to specified crimes.”108 Moreover, prosecuting removal is
often a primary goal of law enforcement officers. That is certainly true of immigration enforcement
agents, to whom the Court effectively grants a license to violate the Fourth Amendment; but it is
also increasingly true of law enforcement officers in general.
In the years since Lopez-Mendoza was decided in 1984, immigration enforcement and removal
have become an increasingly central law enforcement obsession. Political pressure and demagoguery
about immigration has a long history in America,109 but contemporary passions have their roots in
the late decades of the twentieth century and the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001.110 In 1996,
Congress passed a law empowering state and local authorities to enforce some federal immigration
laws.111 The year that law went into force 50,000 aliens were removed from the United States.112 A
year later that number had more than doubled to 114,462.113 It continued to rise in subsequent
years, reaching 174,813 per year by 1998. Those numbers alone provide substantial evidence that

108

130 S.Ct. 1473, 1480 (2010).

109

See generally HUMPHREY JOSEPH DESMOND, THE KNOW NOTHING PARTY: A SKETCH (1905).

See, e.g., Thomas Farragher, Immigration Debate Nears Boiling Point: A Hot Issue on Super Tuesday, It Will Burn in California,
San Jose Mercury News, March 12, 1996 at A1 (reporting on the immigration debate between Pat Buchanan and Bob
Dole during the Republican primary season).

110

See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(c) (authorizing state and local authorities to arrest and detain illegal aliens who have previously
been convicted of a felony or who reenter without permission of the Attorney General after deportation).

111

112

Aliens Removed or Returned, 1892–2010, available at http://www.dhs.gov/files/statistics/publications/YrBk10En.shtm.

As Maureen Sweeney explains, the history of current immigration law is far more complex and no one change or
development can be tagged with responsibility for the dramatic rise in immigration removals since the mid-1990’s. See
Maureen A. Sweeney, Fact or Fiction: The Legal Construction of Immigration Removal for Crimes, 27 YALE J. REG. 47 (2010).
It is beyond our means or purposes here to offer a contrary reductivist explanation. Rather, our point is that the rise
both signifies and engenders heightened focus on immigration enforcement among law enforcement officers at all
levels.

113

[25]

91 TEXAS L. REV.

(2012)

immigration enforcement, and therefore removal, had become a central focus for law enforcement
by the late 1990’s.114 Then came the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 (9-11).
The creation of new agencies and passage of new federal and local laws in the wake of 9-11
made immigration matters an even more central feature of law enforcement consciousness at the
federal, state, and local levels. Created in 2003, Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) is the
principal investigative unit of the Department of Homeland Security where it holds a diverse brief of
criminal and immigration matters.115 With over 20,000 employees, ICE is also the second largest
investigative unit in the federal government behind the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI).116 For
these officers, immigration enforcement and removal is a primary investigative goal. After LopezMendoza, it is a goal that they are free to pursue beyond effective Fourth Amendment review.117
As the federal government has expanded its primary commitment to immigration
enforcement it has also developed extensive cooperative relationships with local and state law
enforcement agencies, bringing removal proceedings closer to the front of the minds of state and
local law enforcement. Soon after 9-11, President George W. Bush’s administration announced
plans to integrate local police as a massive “force multiplier” to assist overburdened federal
immigration agencies.118 The explicit goal was to expand the scope of state and local authorities to
enforce civil immigration laws.119 The Immigration and Naturalization Service and then its
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successor, the Department of Homeland Security, advanced this goal by several means. To start,
these agencies began entering civil immigration information into the National Crime Information
Center, which is a crime and offender database maintained by the FBI.120 This allowed every “local
police officer writing a traffic ticket to determine [whether] a violator is subject to a deportation
order.”121 In 2008, that arrangement become reciprocal through the federal “Secure Communities”
program, which allows ICE to screen automatically arrest data from 1,595 communities in forty-four
states for potential immigration violators and then to issue “detainers” that authorize local law
enforcement to seize and hold any suspected violators.122 Federal officials also began attending local
law enforcement meetings to encourage state and local officers to make enforcing federal
immigration law a part of ordinary policing.123
In 2002, pursuant to Section 287(g) of the Immigration and Nationality Act,124 federal
agencies began entering into explicit agreements with state and local agencies to enforce federal
immigration laws. These “287(g) programs” enable local agencies to combine law enforcement with
the “functions of an immigration officer in relation to investigation, apprehension, or detention of
aliens in the United States.”125 The 287(g) programs also provide extensive training for local law

forced to do so under the Freedom of Information Act. See National Council of La Raza v. Department of Justice, 411
F.3d 350, 353 (2d. Cir. 2005).
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enforcement officers on immigration enforcement matters.126 Part of this training enables use of
“Blackie” warrants,127 which sanction immigration searches based on less than probable cause and
also do not require a particularized description of the place to be searched.128 These warrants fall
well short of basic Fourth Amendment standards, and are now at the disposal of local law
enforcement agencies that accept co-responsibility for enforcing federal immigration laws.129 As of
2011, ICE had entered into 287(g) agreements with sixty-nine law enforcement agencies in twentyfour states.130
These federal outreach programs have been very successful in bringing the prospect of
removal to the front of local law enforcement consciousness during their normal engagements with
citizens. For example, one recent study showed that eighty-three percent of the immigrants arrested
in Gaston County, North Carolina, through their 287(g) program were only charged with traffic
violations. This suggests that, even at the most routine level of engagement between citizens and

Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1045 (1984) (arguing that a civil remedy would still be available for victims even absent the
exclusion remedy).
A copy of this agreement is available at http://www.ice.gov/doclib/detention-reform/pdf/287g_moa.pdf. While the
agreement can be modified around the edges to suit the specific agency, it is a fairly standard form.
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law enforcement officers, immigration is a primary focus.131 If there was any doubt, officers in
Colorado are now advised as a matter of policy to run immigration checks during traffic stops.132
This increased focus on the prospect of removal by police has been remarkably effective. In the
nine years since 287(g) went into effect, removals have more than doubled, from 165,100 in 2002 to
387,242 in 2010.133
Anxious to be of additional service, many states have reacted to continuing complaints about
illegal immigration134 by enacting laws that require local law enforcement officers to enforce federal
immigration policy. Among the most notable are Alabama,135 Arizona,136 Georgia,137 Indiana,138
South Carolina,139 and Utah,140 each of which has passed stringent laws in recent years requiring state
and local authorities to expend time and resources detecting and detaining illegal immigrants.141
The Policies and Politics of Local Immigration Enforcement Laws (American Civil Liberties Union of North Carolina
Foundation and Immigration & Human Rights Policy Clinic, University of North Carolina, Feb. 9, 2009), at 8.
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Ga. Code Ann. § 17-5-100.
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In. Code Ann. § 5-2-18.2.
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SC ST § 17-13-170.

Ut. Code Ann. § 76-9-10. Other states have enacted laws that work at a different link on the law enforcement food
chain. Tennessee amended their public safety code, requiring a procedure to verify the citizenship status of any
individual who is arrested, booked, or confined for any period in any county or municipal detention facility. TN Code
Ann. § 40-7-123(1).
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Several of these codes are presently the subject of legal challenges. See, e.g., Arizona v. United States, No. 11-182, 564
U.S. __ (Dec. 12, 2011); United States v. Alabama, No. 11-14532, (11th Cir. 2011); Hispanic Interest Coalition of
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Many more plan to follow suit. In 2011 alone, state legislatures introduced a combined 1,607 bills
related to immigration.142 Most of these laws require that state and local law enforcement officers
verify citizenship during any “lawful stop, detention, or arrest.”143 Some also empower private
citizens to void without recourse any contracts made with those who cannot prove lawful
immigration status, even if consideration has already been given and received.144 As a result, private
citizens feel empowered to enforce their own brand of “ad hoc immigration justice,” by, for
example, refusing to sell groceries to individuals who cannot prove their immigration status.145 Some
laws also include provisions granting citizens standing to bring civil suits against officials who fail to
seek full enforcement of these provisions.146
Given the current status of the law and law enforcement practice, it is simply implausible to
suggest, as the Court did in Lopez-Mendoza, that police do not prioritize immigration enforcement or
pursue it as an end in itself.147 These developments have solidified immigration enforcement’s place
in the professional consciousness of every police officer in the nation. As a consequence, it can no
longer be said, if it ever could be, that the silver platter doctrine created by the Court in LopezMendoza does not provide significant incentives for police officers across the nation to take

Alabama v. Bentley, No. 11-14535 (11th Cir. 2011); Georgia Latino Alliance for Human Rights v. Deal, No. 11-01804
(11th Cir. 2011).
Alex Dobuzinski, States Introduce More Immigration Laws, Enact Fewer, Reuters, December 13, 2011, available at
http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/12/13/us-immigration-states-idUSTRE7BC23620111213.
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Ut. Code Ann. § 76-9-1003(1). See also A.R.S. § 11-1051(B) (requiring law enforcement to make a reasonable attempt
to determine the citizenship status of an individual during any lawful stop, detention or arrest when reasonable
suspicion exists that the suspect may be an alien); Ga. Code Ann. § 17-5-100(b) (authorizing law enforcement to verify
immigration status when an officer has probable cause to believe the suspect has committed a criminal violation);
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Because the Alabama provision makes contracts with illegal aliens unenforceable in court, some immigrant workers
have been told they will not be paid for work they have already done. See This American Life: Reap What You Sow,
Chicago Public Radio (Jan. 27, 2012) (transcript available at http://www.thisamericanlife.org/radioarchives/episode/456/transcript).
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Al. Code § 31-13-6(d); A.R.S. § 11-1051(H).

In fact, the increasing integration of criminal law and immigration law has given birth to a whole literature on
“crimmigration,” which even has its own blog. See http://crimmigration.com; see also supra note 129.
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significant liberties with the Fourth Amendment. For officers acting on legislative directives to
enforce immigration laws the exclusionary rule serves no deterrent purpose at all. The whole point,
after all, is that the exclusionary rule does not apply. Any evidence they seize will be admissible in a
subsequent immigration hearing regardless of Fourth Amendment concerns.148 After Lopez-Mendoza
officers are therefore encouraged to stop for any reason or for no reason at all and to engage in all
manner of intrusive and unreasonable searches on little or no suspicion if there is the possibility that
removal might be in the offing. In fact, this sort of systematic violation of Fourth Amendment
rights may be required by laws demanding that police officers enforce federal immigration law “to
the full extent permitted.”
The incentive structure created by the synergy between Lopez-Mendoza and contemporary
immigration law and policy raises obvious equal protection concerns.149 Others have given powerful
voice to the worries about racial profiling that bubble from this witches’ brew of federal law, local
statute, and the silver platter doctrine.150 Allegations of racial targeting have never been remediable
by the exclusionary rule, of course.151 We are not suggesting it should be. There is a substantial
difference between remedy and reward, however. Our concern here is that the combination of
Lopez-Mendoza and changes in the priorities of local law enforcement has created affirmative

For that matter, it might also be admissible in a criminal trial. After all, any officer who is primarily interested in
enforcing immigration policy will not be deterred by the remote threat of suppression at a criminal trial. Such are the
vagaries of the spectacular non sequitur.
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See Jane Thamkul, The Plenary Power-Shaped Hole in the Core Constitutional Law Curriculum: Exclusion, Unequal Protection, and
American National Identity, 96 CALIF. L. REV. 553 (2008).

See Kevin R. Johnson, How Racial Profiling in America Became the Law of the Land: United States v. Brignoni-Ponce and
Whren v. United States and the Need for Truly Rebellious Lawyering, 98 GEO. L. J. 1005, 1007 (2010) (suggesting that racial
profiling, while frowned upon in the criminal context, has long been a feature of immigration enforcement).
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Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996). Despite this general limitation, some courts have found that the fruits
of searches motivated by racial bias may be suppressed where the violation is sufficiently “egregious” to implicate
“fundamental fairness.” See, e.g.. United States v. Almeida-Amaral, 461 F.3d 231 (2nd Cir. 2006); United States v.
Gonzalez-Rivera, 22 F.3d 1441 (9th Cir. 1994).
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incentives for officers to engage in disparate treatment of racial minorities.152 These concerns have
been realized throughout the country. For example, the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) recently
concluded that the East Haven, Connecticut, police department engages in biased policing against
Latinos in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.153 Likewise, the DOJ concluded that the
Maricopa County, Arizona, police department routinely engages in unconstitutional policing,
including profiling of Latinos and unlawful stops, arrests, and detentions.154
These concerns have taken on more weight in the wake of recent decisions by some circuit
courts allowing law enforcement to admit illegally seized evidence at a criminal trial if the evidence is
the fruit of a Fourth Amendment violation motivated by an interest in civil removal rather than
criminal investigation.155 For example, in United States v. Oscar-Torres, North Carolina police officers
working in concert with ICE agents arrested Oscar-Torres without any reasonable, particularized
suspicion of illegal activity.156 Agents took Oscar-Torres to ICE headquarters, where he was
fingerprinted. When his fingerprints were run through an FBI database, officers discovered that
Oscar-Torres had previously been deported.157 At a subsequent criminal trial, where he was charged
with illegal reentry under 18 U.S.C. §1326(a),158 Oscar-Torres moved to suppress his fingerprints as
the fruits of an illegal arrest. The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, relying in part on Lopez-Mendoza,
This is not at all far-fetched. For example, Alabama police arrested a Japanese auto executive, who was on assignment
at a local Honda plant, at a roadblock even though he had his passport and an international driver’s license. Arian
Campo-Flores & Miriam Jordan, Alabama Immigration Law Ensnares Auto Workers, WALL ST. J., Dec. 1, 2011,
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970204397704577070811936737218.html.

152

A summary of these findings is available at
http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/spl/documents/easthaven_findletter_12-19-11.pdf.

153

154

http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/spl/documents/mcso_findletter_12-15-11.pdf.

See, e.g., United States v. Oscar-Torres, 507 F.3d 224 (4th Cir. 2007); United States v. Farias-Gonzalez, 556 F.3d 1181,
1189 (11th Cir. 2009); United States v. Olivares-Rangel, 458 F.3d 1104, 1116 (10th Cir. 2006); United States v. Bowley,
435 F.3d 426, 430 (3d Cir. 2006); United States v. Garcia-Beltran, 389 F.3d 864, 868 (9th Cir. 2004).
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Prosecutions for violation of 1326(a) are far and away the most common in the federal system, comprising fully 23%
of the criminal docket in federal courts. See http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/251/.
http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/271/.
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held that the identification evidence should be suppressed if the law enforcement officers’ primary
purpose in gathering that evidence was to investigate possible criminal conduct but should not be
suppressed if their primary purpose was to gather evidence of civil immigration violations.159 The
court then remanded for further fact finding on the motivations of the offending officers.160 “If,”
the court wrote, “illegally obtained evidence that law enforcement officers intend to use in civil
removal hearings cannot be suppressed because exclusion will not effectively deter unlawful arrests,
as Lopez–Mendoza holds, then suppressing that evidence in an unanticipated and unforeseen criminal
prosecution surely cannot provide any additional ex ante deterrence.”161
Oscar-Torres, and similar precedents, layer one silver platter doctrine upon another. The
Supreme Court in Lopez-Mendoza created a new silver platter doctrine that allows the government to
make free use of illegally seized evidence in civil removal proceedings. In the years since that case
was decided, civil immigration enforcement has increasingly become a primary concern for law
enforcement officers at all levels. Because the exclusionary rule does not bar admission of illegally
seized evidence from civil removal proceedings, officers interested in detecting immigration
violations have every motivation to routinely effect illegal searches and seizures because they know
that the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule will not frustrate their primary interests.
Furthermore, they now know that if they violate the Fourth Amendment out of an apparent interest
in civil immigration enforcement and happen upon evidence of criminal activity in the process, then
the combination of the Lopez-Mendoza silver platter doctrine, the spectacular non-sequitur, and the
Oscar-Torres silver platter doctrine will allow them to use that illegally seized evidence at a subsequent
criminal trial. Lopez-Mendoza therefore not only incentivizes Fourth Amendment violations by
providing an alternate venue for tainted evidence, circuit cases decided in its wake have now opened
159

Oscar-Torres, 507 F.3d at 231–32.

160
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a backdoor for admitting that evidence in criminal forums. We cannot imagine a more chilling
example of the pathological potential of the incentives created by the silver platter.
The policies and practices encouraged by this perfect storm of silver platter doctrines and
enforcement policy take little imagination to picture but certainly shock the conscience. If an officer
sees anyone who looks to her like someone who could be foreign because of complexion,
phenotype, accent, comportment, clothing, or demeanor, then she has no incentive not to stop him,
arrest him, fingerprint him, and inventory his possessions as part of an administrative process to
confirm his immigration status. If nothing turns up, then she can release him with apologies.
However, she also knows that any evidence she discovers will be admissible not only at a removal
hearing, but also at a criminal trial as long as she can plausibly show that her conduct constituted
reasonable steps taken to enforce civil immigration laws. There is always the threat of a lawsuit, of
course, but our officer knows that these suits are vanishingly unlikely to be filed and that, if they are,
then qualified immunity and insignificant damages awards make them unlikely to come to much.162
She has, in short, little or no reason to respect the Fourth Amendment. In some respects, to do so
would be irrational given her goals and incentives. In our view, the only way to resolve this absurd
state of the law, and to prevent inevitable injustices, is to follow the Court’s lead in Elkins by
revoking the silver platter doctrine and thereby reducing incentives to violate the Fourth
Amendment.
THE PATHOLOGICAL CONSEQUENCES OF THE CONTEMPORARY SILVER PLATTER DOCTRINE
PART 3: PAROLE REVOCATION PROCEEDINGS
Misunderstandings of the pathological law enforcement incentives created by contemporary
silver platter doctrines continued to plague the Court in Pennsylvania Board of Probation v. Scott,163
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where it held that the exclusionary rule does not bar admission of illegally seized evidence in
probation and parole revocation hearings.164 Scott pleaded nolo contendere in 1983 to a charge of third
degree murder and was released on parole in 1993.165 Five months later, parole officers searched his
home without a warrant, consent, or a claim of emergency.166 During that search they discovered
several firearms, possession of which constituted a violation of Scott’s terms of release. At a
subsequent revocation hearing Scott objected on Fourth Amendment grounds to admission of the
guns into evidence. His request was denied and his parole was revoked. He appealed to the
Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court and the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, which granted him relief,
holding that the scheme for regulating searches of parolees and probationers administered by the
Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole failed to provide sufficient protections for even the
limited Fourth Amendment rights afforded to parolees under its supervision. Justice Thomas,
writing for the Court, reversed.
According to the Scott Court, enforcing the exclusionary rule in parole hearings would serve
no deterrent purpose because offending officers are generally “unaware that the subject of [their]
search[es] [are] parolee[s].” 167 In this circumstance, Justice Thomas wrote, “the officer will likely be
searching for evidence of criminal conduct with an eye toward the introduction of the evidence at a
criminal trial.”168 “The likelihood,” he continued “that illegally obtained evidence will be excluded
To clarify terms, “probation” usually refers to a constraint on freedom enforced as a sentence in itself. “Parole”
usually refers to constraints on freedom enforced as a condition of early release from a prison term. Although the
Court in Scott was confronted with a parolee, subsequent courts have assumed that Scott applies equally to probation
revocation hearings. See, e.g., United States v. Armstrong, 187 F.3d 392 (4th Cir. 1999). But see, State v. Scarlet, 800
So.2d 220 (Fla. 2001) (holding that the exclusionary rule applies to probation revocation hearings because they are
very different from parole revocation hearings); Logan v. Commonwealth, 666 S.E.2d 346 (Va. 2008) (holding that the
exclusionary rule applies to probation revocation hearings when an officer acts in bad faith).
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Scott, 524 U.S. at 359-60.

Id. 360. Immediately following his arrest, Scott gave the law enforcement officers keys to his home, which was
owned by his mother. The officers waited for his mother to arrive before searching. While the officers did not
request or receive consent to search, Scott’s mother did show them to her son’s bedroom. Id.
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from trial provides deterrence against Fourth Amendment violations, and the remote possibility that
the subject is a parolee and that the evidence may be admitted at a parole revocation proceeding
surely has little, if any, effect on the officer’s incentives.”169 Because parole revocation is “outside
the zone of interest” for most police officers, the Court could not see any reason to think that
enforcing the exclusionary rule in parole hearings would result in appreciable deterrence of law
enforcement. As for parole officers who do know parolees’ statuses, the Court saw no reason to
believe that the exclusionary rule would affect them because parole officers are not “engaged in the
often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime.”170 Both views indulge the spectacular non
sequitur and therefore misunderstand law enforcement officers’ motives171 and the effects on general
deterrence wrought by creating a silver platter doctrine.
First, to again paraphrase Hart, it may be true that the threat of excluding evidence from a
parole revocation hearing may not deter an officer entirely ignorant of the possibility that his
investigation might lead to that forum. It does not follow, however, that actually inflicting
suppression in such a circumstance would not result in greater overall compliance with the Fourth
Amendment by that officer and other officers than is accomplished by creating this exception.
Second, it is demonstrably wrong that law enforcement officers are not motivated by an
interest in prosecuting parole and probation violations. In fact, police and prosecutors in many
jurisdictions focus on parole and probation violations as a primary law enforcement goal while
others have designated special task forces that target parole and probation violators.172 It is easy to
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Id.
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Id. (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
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Cf. Bloom & Fentin, supra note 3, at 59.

See, e.g., Jordan Guin, Eight Law Enforcement Agencies Conduct Parole and Probation Searches, LODI NEWS-SENTINEL, May
21, 2011, http://www.lodinews.com/news/article_34eaea0d-bdcc-584e-9790-a5bcfc7dc5c8.html (detailing a task
force performing parole and probation sweeps). See also STATE OF NEW JERSEY, EDWARD BYRNE MEMORIAL JUSTICE
ASSISTANCE GRANT FY 2011 FORMULA PROGRAM (2011), http://www.state.nj.us/lps/crimeplan/pdfs/JAG2011_Program-Narrative_Attachement-1.pdf (reporting on a New Jersey program targeting parolees and
probationers); HAWAI’I STATE JUDICIARY,
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see why they would.173 After all, the burden of proof in revocation hearings is much lower and there
are fewer procedural safeguards. 174 By contrast, the terms of incarceration at stake are often quite
long.175 Just as was the case in Elkins, these incentives to violate the Fourth Amendment undermine
the efforts to secure Fourth Amendment protections in a “particularly ironic way.”176 In particular,
the silver platter doctrine created by Scott licenses policies that encourage officers to routinely violate
the Fourth Amendment with the goal of prosecuting parole violations.177 This bête noire is all the
darker for the likelihood that such policies almost certainly target poor and minority populations in
practice.178

http://www.courts.state.hi.us/special_projects/hope/about_hope_probation.html (last visited August 6, 2011)
(describing Hawai’i’s high-intensity supervision program); Attorney General Cooper Calls for Giving Probation Data to Law
Enforcement, ISLAND GAZETTE, May 6, 2008, http://www.islandgazette.net/newsserver1/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=4621:attorney-general-cooper-calls-for-giving-probationdata-to-law-enforcement&catid=18:crime&Itemid=70 (North Carolina’s Attorney General sets policy keeping closer
track of parolees). See also WISCONSIN DEPT. OF CORRECTIONS, THE 2008/2009 STUDY OF PROBATION AND PAROLE
REVOCATION (2009), http://www.wi-doc.com/PDF_Files/Revocation%20Study_Full%20Report%20%20FINAL.pdf. (examining parole enforcement policy).
As Christopher Slobogin has pointed out, “In a large number of cases involving questionable stops and searches, the
police do not make an arrest, either because they never intended to do so or because they find nothing.” Slobogin,
supra note 96, at 374-75. With the promise that any evidence seized will at least be admissible in a parole hearing,
officers have every incentive to engage in patently illegal searches in neighborhoods and among populations where
their targets are statistically more likely to be on parole or probation.
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In 2009, 658,800 parolees were on parole for one year or more, while only 33,579 were on parole for less than one
year. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NCJ 231674, PROBATION AND PAROLE IN THE
UNITED STATES 40 (2009) (Appendix Table 19). This means that over 80% of parolees had a year or more sentence
left to serve in prison if their parole was violated.
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Justice Jackson, fresh from his stint as chief prosecutor at Nuremberg, pointed out the consequences of such police
practices, noting that: “Uncontrolled search and seizure is one of the first and most effective weapons in the arsenal of
every arbitrary government. And one need only briefly to have dwelt and worked among a people possessed of many
admirable qualities but deprived of these rights to know that the human personality deteriorates and dignity and selfreliance disappear where homes, personas and possessions are subject at any hour to unheralded search and seizure by
the police.” Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 180-81 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
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49, 59. See also infra notes 209-10 and accompanying text.
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Third, it is wrong to suggest that parole officers are not engaged in detecting and prosecuting
crime. Quite to the contrary, as the Court pointed out in Samson v. California, one of parole officers’
primary duties is to detect, document, and prosecute through the parole system crimes committed
by their charges.179 In Minnesota v. Murphy, the Supreme Court also pointed out that parole officers
are “peace officer[s], and as such [are] allied, to a greater or lesser extent, with [their] fellow peace
officers.”180 Given their aligned interests, it is no surprise that parole officers routinely cooperate
with police and other law enforcement officials.181 Although admirable in the abstract, these close
working relationships raise serious Fourth Amendment concerns after Scott. The original silver
platter doctrine was limited. If the state agents worked with or at the direction of federal agents
when violating the Fourth Amendment, then the silver platter doctrine did not apply and the
evidence would be excluded in federal court. There is no such limitation on the silver platter
doctrine created by the Court in Scott. The Court therefore left the door open for police and other
law enforcement agents to recruit parole officials to an ever greater degree into their “competitive
enterprise of ferreting out crime,” where there are powerful incentives for them to proceed without
regard to, or even with contumacious disregard of, Fourth Amendment rights.182 Here again, the
only remedy is the one prescribed by the Court in Elkins: to revoke the silver platter doctrine.
One might respond to these concerns by pointing to the Court’s contention in Scott that
parole revocation cannot be a primary driver for law enforcement because police do not know ex
179

547 U.S. 843, 849 (2006).
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465 U.S. 420, 432 (1984).

See Scott, 524 U.S. 373-74 (Souter, J., dissenting) (citing United States ex rel. Santos v. New York State Bd. of Parole,
441 F.2d 1216, 1217 (2d Cir.1971)); Grimsley v. Dodson, 696 F.2d 303, 304 (4th Cir. 1982); State ex rel. Wright v.
Ohio Adult Parole Auth., 661 N.E.2d 728, 730 (Ohio 1996); People v. Stewart, 242 Ill.App.3d 599, 611–12 (1993);
People v. Montenegro, 173 Cal.App.3d 983, 986 (4th Dist. 1985)).
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See, e.g., Alaska Dept. of Corrections, Probation Officer and Private Person Searches (2009), available at
http://www.dps.state.ak.us/APSC/docs/legalmanual/NPROBATIONOFFICERSANDPRIVATEPERSONSEARC
HES.pdf (“As a condition of parole or probation, the Court may order that the defendant subject his person,
residence or vehicle to searches that will be conducted by his/her probation officers.” The bulletin does not discuss
the need for a warrant in these parolee searches.)
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ante that a citizen whose rights are being violated is a parolee or probationer. This is naïve. “[L]ocal
police know local felons.”183 They also know where the centers of criminal activity are in their
jurisdictions, and therefore can place pretty good bets that a substantial proportion of citizens found
on some street corners or in some bars are on parole or probation.184 It is also an unfortunate truth
that, due to a host of social factors, a higher proportion of citizens who live in poor and minority
neighborhoods are on parole or probation than those who live in affluent white neighborhoods.185
Therefore, even where a police officer’s first-line goal is to detect and prosecute a crime rather than
to revoke parole or probation, the collateral pathway for admission of illegally seized evidence
created by the Court in Scott provides police with a critical safety net for a general practice of
aggressive searches that cross the Fourth Amendment line if the victims are poor, minorities, or
both.
This last concern cannot be overstated. Although the targets of unreasonable searches may
sometimes be parolees and probationers, the incentives created by Scott are indiscriminate. It is
therefore easy to imagine police adopting a de facto or even explicit strategy of routine Fourth
Amendment violations in many urban centers or along many rural byways. Take New York City as
an example. According to official records, New York City police officers conducted a record
684,000 “stops and frisks” in 2011. Only six percent of these stops resulted in arrest, raising serious

See, e.g., People v. Stewart, 242 Ill.App.3d 599, 611–12 (detailing police officer’s knowledge that victim of an illegal
traffic stop and search was on probation). The electronic monitoring industry has continued to expand since the mid1980’s making it all the more likely that local police know the whereabouts of local felons. By 2003, Texas, Florida,
and New Jersey all used global positioning satellites (GPS) to track parolees’ moves. JOAN PETERSILIA, WHEN
PRISONERS COME HOME 194 (2003).
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For another plausible solution, see Martha Worner, Pennsylvania Parole Bd. v. Scott: The Taking of Parolee’s Fourth
Amendment Right to Privacy, 51 BAYLOR L. REV. 1115, 1144-48 (1999). Worner argues for the awareness standard, under
which an officer’s illegal search and seizure would be subject to exclusion if he was aware that the suspect was on
parole. This would further the Court’s deterrence objective, while maintaining integrity in parole search practices.

184

In the 2010 Census, 14 percent of the population identified themselves as “black.” However, a disproportionate 39
percent of the parole population in 2010 was black. Although whites constituted 75 percent of the entire United
States population in 2010, they only make up 42 percent of the parole population.

185

[39]

91 TEXAS L. REV.

(2012)

concern for the constitutionality of the remainder. More disturbing still is eighty-seven percent of
those stopped were black or Hispanic.186
As was made clear in United States v. Payner,187 the contemporary silver platter doctrines
remove any aversion the Court might have to these kinds of policies. According to facts accepted
by the Court in Payner, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) was frustrated with its inability to arrest
and prosecute American citizens who were hiding income in offshore banks.188 Agents therefore
decided to employ a prostitute and a burglar to assist them in stealing bank records. According to
plan, the prostitute seduced an employee of one of the suspect banks while he was in the United
States on business. She then persuaded him to leave his hotel room so that the burglar could steal
his briefcase. Once the briefcase was secure, the burglar worked with IRS agents to have a key
fabricated and then waited while they made photocopies of its contents. Among the documents
they copied were papers showing that Payner had deposited unreported income.
This operation was not the work of rogue agents. To the contrary, the agents involved
sought and received prior approval from their supervisors and in-house attorneys.189 Although
illegal, the operation received approval because the agents and their legal advisors knew that they
were violating the Fourth Amendment rights of the bank employee, not his clients, and that,
therefore, the clients would not have “standing” to object to admission of the illegally seized
evidence if they were subsequently prosecuted.190
Faced with these facts the district found that:

186

See Sean Gardiner, Stop-and-Frisks Hit Record in 2011, WALL ST. J. (Feb, 12, 2012).

187

447 U.S. 727 (1980).

188

Id. at 729-31; id. at 739-43 (Marshall, J., dissenting).

189

Id. at 739.

See, e.g., Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83 (1998); United States v. Padilla, 508 U.S. 77 (1993); Minnesota v. Olson, 495
U.S. 91 (1990); United States v. Payner, 448 U.S. 911 (1980); Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98 (1980); United States
v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83 (1980); Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978); Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165 (1969);
Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960).
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It is evident that the Government and its agents . . . were, and are, well aware that,
under the standing requirement of the Fourth Amendment, evidence obtained
from a party pursuant to an unconstitutional search is admissible against third
parties [whose] own privacy expectations are not subject to the search, even though
the cause for the unconstitutional search was to obtain evidence incriminating
those third parties. This Court finds that, in its desire to apprehend tax evaders, a
desire the Court fully shares, the Government affirmatively counsels its agents that
the Fourth Amendment standing limitation permits them to purposefully conduct
an unconstitutional search and seizure of one individual in order to obtain evidence
against third parties, who are the real targets of the governmental intrusion, and
that the IRS agents in this case acted, and will act in the future, according to that
counsel.191

Based on its finding that the rule on standing was being affirmatively exploited by government
agents to engage in searches they knew to be illegal, the district court granted Payner’s motions to
suppress in order “to signal all likeminded individuals that purposeful criminal acts on behalf of the
Government will not be tolerated in this country and that such acts shall never be allowed to bear
fruit.”192
Given its deterrence concerns and frequent condemnation of flagrant Fourth Amendment
violations, one would have expected the Supreme Court to affirm. It did not. Rather, it reversed on
the ground that the bank employee was the only person with standing to raise a Fourth Amendment
claim and that, as a general rule, granting the remedy of exclusion only to parties with standing is
sufficient to deter law enforcement officers from violating the Fourth Amendment.193 Leaving aside
the fact that Payner itself demonstrated the folly of that hope,194 the Court’s holding in that case,
combined with its holding in Scott, opens the door for law enforcement officers to adopt policies of
routinely violating the Fourth Amendment in neighborhoods inhabited by our most vulnerable
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citizens knowing that, even if illegally seized evidence is not admissible in a criminal trial, it will be
available to pursue the revocation of someone’s parole or probation.195
There is good evidence that many of these fears have come to pass and that law
enforcement increasingly is pursuing parole violations as a primary law enforcement objective in
order to circumnavigate the Fourth Amendment. The Bureau of Justice Statistics publishes annual
bulletins regarding probation and parole statistics in the United States. In 2009 there were 819,308
people on parole in the United States.196 That same year 185,550 parolees returned to prison via
revocation, while only 47,882 returned on new convictions.197 This marks a dramatic shift from
1980 when only 27,000 parolees were revoked.198 Part of this increase is a consequence of an
extraordinary increase in background incarceration rates—the number of parolees who returned to
prison in 2000 is roughly equal to the total number of state prisoners in 1980.199 But the trend
toward parole revocation as a primary law enforcement strategy is evident even in relative terms.
For example, in 1980 only seventeen percent of the prison population consisted of parole violators,
but that proportion had risen to thirty-five percent by 1999.200 During that same twenty-year span,
the number of parolees who returned to prison on new convictions tripled, but the number of
parolees who returned to prison after revocation increased a staggering seven-fold.201 That trend has

There is, of course, the possibility that such a policy might be the target of a civil action. Unfortunately, as Jennifer
Laurin has recently pointed out, the threat of civil sanction in Fourth Amendment cases against individual officers or
their agencies is far too weak to provide much discouragement. See, Laurin, supra note 17.
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continued apace in subsequent years,202 encouraged as it has been by the contemporary silver platter
doctrine.203
The results of a recent investigation of the Oakland Police Department204 offer a disturbing
case study documenting the consequences of the silver platter doctrine created by Scott. One
anecdote tells the story. According to facts recounted in the report, officers conducting a narcotics
investigation found out that a subject who allegedly sold drugs to a confidential informant was on
probation.205 The officers were aware that the subject was not listed as a probationer in another
database. Although the investigation likely produced ample information to establish probable cause
for a warrant, the investigating officers elected to conduct a warrantless search of the subject’s
residence instead.206 When asked why they did not seek a search warrant, the sergeant in charge
replied that “the use of the probation search granted the officers broader scope to search within the
residence.”207 The subject filed a claim alleging illegal search, excessive force, and evidence
planting.208
This account was published in a report by Robert Warshaw, the Independent Monitor for
the Oakland Police Department, who is charged with observing the department’s compliance with

See id. at 21, 24 (citing BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NPS-1 SERIES, NATIONAL PRISONER
STATISTICS) (emphasizing the explosive growth in parole violations from 1980 to 2000). For a full list of Bureau of
Justice Statistics sources used in this report, see id. at 3. Based on Figure 15 of this report, approximately 25,000
prisoners returned to prison in 1980, and just under 200,000 returned in 2000.
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fifty-one reform measures mandated by a consent decree.209 Although it is not part of his core
reporting responsibilities, in his most recent report, Warshaw added an appendix on his own
initiative analyzing searches and seizures of parolees and probationers.210 Warshaw reported that a
disproportionate number of blacks were represented in these samples. For example, ninety-one
percent of the parolees or probationers stopped or arrested were black.211 Another set of statistics
suggested that law enforcement was scouring the city and confronting people in the hopes that they
were on parole or probation. In one sample, sixty-nine percent of approached subjects either
acknowledged that they were on probation or parole when asked or the officers already knew the
subject’s status.212 Eighty-six percent of these subjects were searched, but only a very few were
arrested. Of these stops, nine percent led to warrantless searches of residences.213
Based on his study, Warshaw concluded that Oakland police officers were relying excessively
on searches of parolees or probationers and that racial minorities were too frequently the targets.
He in fact found that officers routinely asked citizens about their status as parolees or probationers
during casual encounters and stops without obvious justification save for an interest in searching.214
Although this is but one example, there is no reason to believe that these practices are not occurring
across the United States. A central problem, of course, is a lack of oversight and accountability.
Because the exclusionary rule does not apply, Fourth Amendment issues are not litigated in parole

See Aaron Sankin, Oakland Police Department Only Weeks Away From Being Placed in Federal Control,
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/01/27/oakland-police-department_n_1237785.html (Jan. 27, 2012, 7:20 PM)
(“In 2000, a group rogue of Oakland police officers, calling themselves the "Rough Riders," were found to have
planted evidence, used excessive force and falsified police reports. As part of a negotiated settlement three years later,
the city was ordered to take 51 specific steps toward reform or else lose operational control of the department.”)
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proceedings and the circumstances of searches are therefore not published or made available to the
public. Only because of the extreme nature of the violations in Oakland do we have a window in at
all.
CONCLUSION
In addition to the grand jury, removal proceedings, and parole revocation hearings, the
Court has established two other silver platter doctrines, one for civil tax suits215 and the other for
habeas corpus petitions.216 Neither need delay us very long here. United States v. Payner, the facts of
which are set forth in the previous section, give lie to any claim that providing a silver platter
doctrine allowing illegally seized evidence to be admitted in civil tax proceedings will not encourage
Fourth Amendment violations. Quite to the contrary, as the facts in Payner show, IRS agents
frequently will go to great lengths, even to the point of engaging in criminal conduct, in order to
secure evidence of tax violations. Habeas corpus petitions, because they lie behind criminal
prosecutions as a procedural matter, probably are comparatively more remote for most law
enforcement officers, but the Court nevertheless does indulge the spectacular non sequitur when
arguing that suppression in these proceedings will not add to the general deterrent effect of the
exclusionary rule.
This, then, is where we will rest our provocations in this essay: each of the new silver platter
doctrines created by the Court since Calandra is built on the spectacular non sequitur and therefore
creates perverse incentives. They also have a cumulative effect that dramatically diminishes the
force and efficacy of the exclusionary rule. As Professors Mertens and Wasserstrom have pointed
out, exploitation of these opportunities by law enforcement need not be conscious in order to put
Fourth Amendment rights at risk. “Although the police may not be thinking about any particular
215
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one of these permissible collateral uses of unlawfully-seized evidence, they may well go ahead with
the unlawful search, confident that in one way or another it is likely to pay off.”217
Those incentives are likely to have greater salience and to grant broader latitude if the
citizens targeted are vulnerable. Just as an example, imagine an officer who sees two Hispanic men
driving through a low-income, inner-city neighborhood with a reputation as a drug market. Without
appealing to racial profiling, the officer cannot justify a stop, but he has a gut feeling and stops the
car anyway. During a subsequent search he discovers a small amount of marijuana. To borrow
from Justice Marshall, in his “worst case scenario,” our officer “avoids a major expenditure of time
and effort, ensures that the suspect will not escape, and procures” evidence that will be admissible in
a subsequent grand jury proceeding, parole hearing, removal hearing, tax suit, or habeas litigation,218
even if it “cannot be used in the prosecution’s case in chief.”219 Not only is that not a bad outcome,
it comes quite close to making respect for Fourth Amendment rights look irrational from a police
officer’s point of view by “creat[ing] powerful incentives for police officers to violate the Fourth
Amendment.”220
In the halcyon days of the exclusionary rule, when principled concerns reigned supreme,
Justice Holmes wrote that “[t]he essence of a provision forbidding the acquisition of evidence in a
certain way is that not merely evidence so acquired shall not be used before the Court but that it
shall not be used at all.”221 The principles underlying that conclusion are as valid now as they were
then. The Court rejected the original silver platter doctrine in Elkins on both utilitarian and
principled grounds. The current Court ought to draw a lesson from its forebears and abandon its
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experimentation with modern-day silver platter doctrines, if not out of a commitment to
consistency, then out of a commitment to logic, coherency, reasonableness, good sense, and the
Fourth Amendment itself.
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